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COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - COMPULSORY PROCESS TO OBTAIN EVIDENCE- UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE -That the issuance
of a subpoena duces tecum must comply with the provisions of the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures was
first established in the case of Boyd v. United States.1 The writ was
1

u6 U. S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524 (1886). This holding is attacked by
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there obtained for the purpose of extracting from a person evidence
which was to be used against him in a criminal proceeding or forfeiture.
This compulsory process which gave the state possession of a man's
personal papers to incriminate him was considered a violation of not
only the Fifth, but also the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court
could have reached the same result on the basis of the Fifth Amendment alone and it is difficult to see why it regarded as a "search and
seizure" this orderly process issuing out of a court of law and leaving
the actual production of the papers with the party served. But this
doctrine was reaffirmed in the later case of Hale v. Henkel2 and was
applied in aid of a corporation where the issue was not in any way
clouded by an application of the Fifth Amendment.8 The subpoena
was there issued on behalf of a grand jury investigating violations of
the antitrust laws and demanded production of all books, papers, and
correspondence of the corporation since its inception. The Court held
this an unreasonable inquiry, too broad and sweeping in its terms and
not limited to a request for relevant material suitably described.4 Just
what constituted "reasonable inquiry" was left open for interpretation
at a later period.
With the rapid growth: of administrative tribunals in the field of
governmental regulation of business the problem became particularly
acute. As might be expected, the courts adopted different standards
of reasonableness depending upon whether the business was one in the
nature of a public utility or was just a private enterprise. The railroads certainly came within the category of public utilities and the
Court developed a liberal concept of "reasonable inquiry" by the Interstate Commerce Commission, but not without some hesitation. It was
early recognized that the commission could force the production of
EvmENCE, 3d ed., § 2264(2)(b) (1940). See: Fraenkel, "Concerning Searches and
Seizures," 34 HARv. L. REv. 361 at 366 ff. (1921); Handler, "The Constitutionality
of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission," 28 CoL. L. REv. 905 at 912
(1928); 44 YALE L. J. 819 at 825 ff. (1935).
2
201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370 (1906). See: Dession and Cohen, "The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries," 41 YALE L. J. 687 (1932); 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, 10th ed., § 1264 (1918).
3
A corporation is not protected by the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth
Amendment. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370 (1906); Wilson v.
United States, 221 U. S. 361, 31 S. Ct. 538 (1910); Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182 (1920); Essgee Co. of China v.
United States, 262 U.S. 151, 43 S. Ct. 514 (1922).
4
Where the inquiry is reasonable and the material demanded suitably specified and
relevant to inquiry, subpoenas quite broad in their requirements have been upheld. In
re Bornn Hat Co., (C. C. N. Y. 1911) 184 F. 506, affirmed sub nom. Bornn Hat
Co. v. United States, 223 U.S. 713, 32 S. Ct. 521 (1912); Grant v. United States,
227 U. S. 74, 33 S. Ct. 190 (1913); Brown v. United States, 276 U. S. 134, 48
S. Ct. 288 (1928).
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evidence when investigating violations of the act. 5 The Interstate
Commerce Act gave the commission power to compel the production of
evidence for purposes of the act; 6 authorized it to inquire into the
management and conduct of carriers; 7 and ordered it to report information of value to Congress.8 But in Harriman v. Interstate Com,merce Commission 9 the Court evinced great displeasure with the contention that Congress intended this power to be used for purposes of
general investigation. Indeed, it excluded the possibility by referring
to another section of the act dealing with investigation of complaints 10
and declared that Congress must have intended to restrict the use of
compulsory process to complaint cases. When the section was later
broadened by amendment,11 the Court in Smith v. Interstate Commerce
Commission 12 was forced to acknowledge the legislative intent that
general investigations were properly implemented by power to force
the production of evidence by subpoena. It was further conceded that
the commission in so acting was not conducting an unreasonable inquiry
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Thus the Court recognized the
need for complete information in regulating an industry so basic to the
public needs as that of transportation of persons and property for hire.
This decision established the right of a federal administrative agency to
force a public utility to produce evidence for the purposes of ( r) inquiry into violations of the statute; (2) general fact finding investigations as a basis for reports to Congress.18
6

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 S. Ct. 1125
(1894); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 24 S. Ct. 563
(1904). See Lilienthal, "The Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony," 39 HARV. L. REV. 694 at 713 (1926).
6
24 Stat. L. 383, § 12 (1887), 49 U.S. C. (1935), § 12.
1

Id.

24 Stat. L. 387, § 21 (1887), 49 U.S. C. (1935), § 21.
211 U.S. 407, 29 S. Ct. 115 (1908).
10
24 Stat. L. 384, § 13 (1887): "Said Commission shall in like manner investigate any complaint forwarded by the railroad commissioner or railroad commission of
any State or Territory, at the request of such commissioner or commission, and
may institute any inquiry on its own motion in the same manner and to the same
effect as though complaint had been made."
11
36 Stat. L. 551, § 13 (1910), 49 U.S. C. (1935), § 13: "and the Interstate
Commerce Commission shall have full authority and power at any time to institute an
inquiry, on its own motion, in any case and as to any matter or thing concerning which
a complaint is authorized to be made, to or before said commission by any provision
of this Act, or concerning which any question may arise under any of the provisions of
this Act, or relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions of this Act."
12
245 U.S. 33, 38 S. Ct. 30 (1917).
18
If a state commission is investigating, there is a plenary power of visitation over
corporations created by the state, or permitted by it to do business within its boundaries.
Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541, 28 S. Ct. 178 (1908);
Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 29 S. Ct. 370 (1909); State ex
8

9
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In Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co. 14 the
Supreme Court denied the commission the power to compel a private
industry to produce its records and papers for a general fact finding
investigation. Justice Holmes denounced such "fishing expeditions"
and declared that "the mere facts of carrying on a commerce not confined within state lines and of being organized as a corporation do not
make men's affairs public, as those of a railroad company now may
be." 15 The Court clearly felt that the government's need for information upon which to base regulations did not justify "The interruption
of business, the possible revelation of trade secrets, and the expense
that compliance with the Commission's wholesale demand would
cause." Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, the commission
was authorized to gather information concerning the management and
practices of corporations engaged in commerce,16 and to use compulsory process for the obtaining of evidence where corporations were
being investigated or proceeded against.11 In denying the commission
the right to obtain evidence for purposes of general investigation, the
Court declared that the statute did not authorize such compulsion
where no violation of the act was involved.18 It further stated that in
absence of explicit language in the affirmative, it would not infer that
Congress intended to grant such a power. Thus, by a somewhat imagirel. Public Utilities Commission v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., I 15 Kan. 3, 221 P.
359 (1923); State ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse Commission v. United States Express
Co., 81 Minn. 87, 83 N. W. 465 (1900).
H 264 U.S. 298, 44 S. Ct. 336 (1924). See: Mechem, "Fishing Expeditions by
Commissions," 22 MICH. L. REv. 765 (1924); 35 MICH. L. REv. 510 (1937);
Watkins, "An Appraisal of the \Vork of the Federal Trade Commission," 32 CoL. L.
REv. 272 at 280 (1932).
15
264 U.S. 298 at 305, 306, 44 S. Ct. 336 (1924).
18
38 Stat. L. 721, § 6 (1914), 15 U. S. C. (1935), § 46: "That the commission shall also have power-(a) To gather and compile i~formation concerning,
and to investigate from time to time the organization, business, conduct, practices, and
management of any corporation engaged in commerce, excepting banks and common
carriers subject to the Act to regulate commerce, and its relation to other corporations
and to individuals, associations, and partnerships."
17
38 Stat. L. 722, § 9 (1914), 15 U.S. C. (1935), § 49: "That for the purposes of this Act the commission, or its duly authorized agent or agents, shall at all
reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy
any documentary evidence of any corporation being investigated or proceeded against;
and the commission shall have power to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all such documentary evidence relating to
any matter under investigation."
18 The federal courts have not interfered with investigations of unfair methods of
competition in violation of the act. Federal Trade Commission v. Nulomoline Co.,
(C. C. A. 2d, 1918) 254 F. 988; T. C. Hurst & Son v. Federal Trade Commission,
(D. C. Va. 1920) 268 F. 874; Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal
Trade Commission, (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) 280 F. 45.
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native interpretation of the statute,19 the Court avoided expressing
itself on the constitutional issue, but decisions in the lower federal
courts have indicated that Congress could not constitutionally grant
such broad powers of discovery.20 Under the Securities Act the Securities and Exchange Commission has very specifi.cally been given the power
to compel the production of evidence in making general fact-finding
investigations.21 Since Congress has explicitly shown its intention in this
act, the power of the commission will have to be determined upon a
constitutional basis. A lower court has already upheld the provisions
for obtaining evidence where the commission is inquiring into violations
of the act,22 but in regard to general investigations the question is still
unanswered. 23
The circuit court of appeals case of Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde 24
recognized one other type of business besides the public utility whose
documents are subject to compulsory production in aid of general investigations. Under the Grain Futures Act,25 grain dealers on the
Chicago Board of Trade were forced to produce their books and papers
for inspection by agents of the Department of Agriculture when there
was no charge or suspicion of conduct contrary to law. The court classified this business as one "affected with a public interest" and therefore subject to visitation and disclosure in the interests of government
regulation for the benefit of the public. These broad powers of inspection were held necessary in order to enable federal officers to detect the
unlawful speculations in grain against which the act was aimed. In
view of the public need for such action by the government, the claim
of accompanying disturbance and expense to the dealers was dismissed
as unworthy of serious consideration.26
19
Handler, "The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission," 28 CoL. L. REv. 708 at 720 ff., 733 (1928).
20
United States v. Basic Products., (D. C. Pa. 1919) 260 F. 472 at 482;
Federal Trade Commission v. Baltimore Grain Co., (D. C. Md. 1922) 284 F. 886
at 890; Federal Trade Commission v. Millers' Nat. Federation, (App. D. C. 1927)
23 F. (2d) 968, rehearing denied (App. D. C. 1928), unpublished opinion by
Smith, J.
21 48 Stat. L. 85, § 19(b} (1934), 15 U.S. C. (1935), § 77s(b).
22 McMann v. Engel, (D. C. N. Y. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 446.
23 But see Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct.
654 (1936), where the Court speaks with distaste of "fishing expeditions" previously
condemned by Justice Holmes.
2 ,i, Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, (C. C. A. 7th, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 350, cert.
den. sub nom. Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Wallace, 290 U.S. 654, 54 S. Ct. 70 (1933).
25 42 Stat. L. 998 (1922), 7 U.S. C. (1935), c. 1, amended by the Commodity
Exchange Act, 49 Stat. L. 1491 (1936), 7 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), c. I.
• 2 6 But see Cudahy Packing Co. v. United States, (C. C. A. 7th, 1926) 15 F.
(2d) 133. Under Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. L. 159 (1921), 7 U.S. C.
( 193 5), c. 9, the Secretary of Agriculture was given the same powers of inspection as
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The court's use of the phrase "affected with a public interest" in
the Hyde case injected into the picture a definition of variable pitch
and the recent decision of Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 27
under the Fair Labor Standards Act has served to amplify its importance. The Supreme Court in declaring this act constitutional also
indicated that the provisions for the keeping and producing of wagehour records could be justified upon the basic principle that they were
necessary to the proper enforcement of a valid law.28 Congress has
clearly demonstrated an intention to give the administrator of the Fair
Labor Standards Act such powers of investigation "as he may deem
necessary or appropriate" for discovering violations of the act. 29 It was
objected in the Montgomery Ward case that the administrator could
not inspect the documents 80 of a private business when he lacked reasonable grounds for believing that there was a violation of the act. In
upholding the order of the lower court issuing a subpoena duces
tecum 31 for the production of wage and hour records the Court declared that a showing of probable cause was dispensed with in the case
of a business "affected with a public interest." According to the
Supreme Court this term meant no more than "that an industry, for
adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good." 82 Since the
protection of interstate commerce constituted an adequate reason for
control by the Fair Labor Standards Act, all industries regulated by it
the Federal Trade Commission. The court held he had no right to copy books of account and records of packers in advance of any complaint or charge of impropriety even
though the business was impressed with a public interest.
27
(C. C. A. 7th, 1940) II4 F. (2d) 384, cert. den. sub nom. Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Fleming, 3u U.S. 690, 61 S. Ct. 71 (1940).
28
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 at 125, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941): "These
requirements are incidental to those for the prescribed wages and hours, and hence
validity of the form~r turns on validity of the latter. Since, as we have held, Congress
may require production for interstate commerce to conform to those conditions, it may
require the employer, as a means of enforcing the valid law, to keep a record showing
whether he has in fact complied with it."
29
52 Stat. L. 1066, § u(a) (1938), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 2u(a):
"The Administrator ... may investigate and gather data regarding the wages, hours,
and other conditions and practices of employment in any industry subject to this Act,
and may enter and inspect such places and such records .• and investigate such facts,
conditions, practices, or matters as he may deem necessary or appropriate to determine
whether any person has violated any provision of this Act..•."
80
52 Stat. L. 1066, § II(c) (1938), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 2u(c):
''Every employer subject to any provision of this Act or of any order issued under this
Act shall make, keep, and preserve such records of the persons employed by him • • •
and shall make such reports therefrom to the Administrator as he shall prescribe by
regulation or order••••"
81 Subpoenas also issued in: Fleming v. G. & C. Novelty Shoppe, (D. C. Ill. 1940)
35 F. Supp. 829; Fleming v. Lowell Sun Co., (D. C. Mass. 1940) 36 F. Supp. 320.
112 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 at 536, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934).
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were affected with a public interest and for enforcement purposes subject to routine inspections. Admittedly the legalistic syllogism is complete, but what are the implications of this decision? It obliterates the
veiled proscriptions of the American Tobacco case against searches conducted in the hope that some evidence of misconduct will be uncovered.
Furthermore, the language of this Court does not indicate that it
would find any serious constitutional objection to those provisions of
statutes which authorize the various commissions to make general investigations of private business for the purpose of purveying information to Congress. 33 If the commissions are henceforth to exercise such
broad powers as this decision would seem to sanction, they will be
obliged to use discretion. For without it, the resulting disturbance and
expense to business of prolonged and extensive investigations and the
revelation of valuable trade secrets would be too high a price to pay
for the information obtained.84
William C. Wetherbee, Jr.

83 This power of investigation may well be restricted to matters upon which
Congress can legislate, but this is not a stringent limitation. Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U. S. 168 (1880); In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, 17 S. Ct. 677 (1897);
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319 (1927); Sinclair v. United
States, 279 U. S. 263, 49 S. Ct. 368 (1939); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S.
125, 55 S. Ct. 375 (1934). See: Landis, "Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation," 40 HARV. L. REv. 153 (1926); Herwitz and Mulligan, "The Legislative Investigating Committee," 33 CoL. L. REv. 4 (1933).
u For discussions concerning the advantages and disadvantages of such general
investigations at the expense of private rights and for opinions as to the constitutionality of such investigations, see: Jouett, "The Inquisitorial Feature of the Federal
Trade Commission Act Violates the Federal Constitution," 2 VA. L. REV. 584
(1915); Randolph, "The Inquisitorial Power Conferred by the Trade Commission
Bill," 23 YALE L. J. 672 (1914); Needham, "The Federal Trade Commission," 16
CoL. L. REv. I 7 5 ( I 9 l 6) ; Stradley, "Constitutionality of the Compulsory Statistical
Reports of the Federal Trade Commission," 76 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 19 (1927);
Hankin, "Validity and Constitutionality of the Federal Trade Commission Act," 19
ILL. L. REv. 17 ( 1924), believes them constitutional; see also 1 BILL OF RIGHTS
· REV. 137 (1941).

